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THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF CITIZEN
SUITS UNDER EPCRA: CAN CITIZENS SUE
FOR PAST VIOLATIONS OF THE
STATUTE'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS?
I. INTRODUcTION
In the biblical tale of David and Goliath, a powerless under-
dog took on a mighty giant. The fearsome Goliath disdained
David because of his youth and inexperience, but David used the
limited resources of a stone and the power of his faith to fell Goli-
ath and win the day.' An analogous story has developed in the
growing arena of environmental law, where a constant battle rages
between the powerless citizen, seeking to enforce a variety of
compliance standards, and the corporate giant, seeking to escape
liability despite society's increasing sensitivity to environmental
destruction.
When Congress enacted the Emergency Planning and Com-
munity Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986,2 it tried to alleviate
the struggle between the Davids and Goliaths of the environ-
mental battleground. EPCRA arms citizens with the powerful tool
of essential information on hazardous substances by providing a
stringent set of reporting requirements for corporations dealing
with hazardous substances.3 These requirements result in publicly
available disclosure forms, which alert citizens to the threats pre-
4sented by such substances. Further, the requirements allow com-
munities to create response plans in the event of hazardous emer-
gencies.
5
Although EPCRA has several enforcement sections,6 the
1. See 1 Samuel 17:1-54.
2. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050
(1994)).
3. See 42 U.S.C. H3 11021-11023.
4. See id. §§ 11021(c)(2), 11022(e)(3), 11023(h), 11044.
5. See id. § 11003.
6. See id. § 11045-11046. These sections provide the Administrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) with primary authority to enforce the Act,
while giving states, local governments, and citizens certain judicial access should the
EPA fail to act. See id. The provisions allow the EPA and others to order facilities
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citizen-suit provision7 is one of the most frequently litigated. Be-
cause of ambiguities within the provision, citizens have encoun-
tered several obstacles while pursuing industry compliance with
the Act.8 One of the more significant issues within the Act's citi-
zen-suit provision is whether citizens may bring suit for reporting
violations that are wholly past and have been corrected before a
citizen suit is filed.
EPCRA's citizen-suit provision allows "any person [to] com-
mence a civil action.., against... [a]n owner or operator of a fa-
cility for failure to... [c]omplete and submit an inventory form
under section 11022(a) ... [or] [c]omplete and submit a toxic
chemical release form under section 11023(a)." 9 The absence of
specific timing requirements within the citizen-suit provision has
perplexed courts: Can a facility preclude a citizen's suit by filing
the requisite forms after receiving notice of the intent to sue 0 but
before a lawsuit has been filed with the court? On one hand, the
provision seems to require only that facilities complete and submit
the reqpired forms before the citizen's suit has been filed with the
court. On the other hand, the provision also refers to 42 U.S.C.
to comply with the Act's requirements. See id. In the event of noncompliance, fa-
cilities may be assessed civil, administrative, and criminal penalties. See id. § 11045.
7. See id. § 11046(a)(1).
8. See Eric M. Falkenberry, The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act: A Tool for Toxic Release Reduction in the 90's, 3 BuFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 15-
21 (1995). Among the difficulties confronting citizens bringing enforcement actions
are (1) proving "injury in fact," see Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting
Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., No. 90-CV-1109S, 1993 WL 114676, at *2-7 (W.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 1993), and (2) proving that the citizen suit is not an unconstitutional dele-
gation of power under the separation-of-powers doctrine. See Delaware Valley
Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1132, 1136-38 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1).
10. EPCRA requires citizens, prior to filing suit, to give notice to the alleged
perpetrator. See id. § 11046(d) ("No [citizen suit] may be commenced under subsec-
tion,(a)(1)(A) of [the] section prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of
the alleged violation to ... the alleged violator.").
11. After receiving notice of the citizen's intent to sue, a facility has 60 days to
correct its failure to annually file the required forms. Yet this reality is disconcerting
in that the "failure to file" is rarely an administrative oversight but rather a deliber-
ate effort by a corporation to avoid filing forms that could subject them to additional
costly environmental regulation and, perhaps worse, bad publicity. See, e.g., Robert
W. Shavelson, EPCRA, Citizen Suits and the Sixth Circuit's Assault on the Public's
Right-to-Know, 2 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 29, 37-38 (1995) (stating that if facilities
need only complete and submit the required forms before a citizen suit has been
filed, violators will wait as long as they can to comply With the requirements, thereby
avoiding enforcement and maintaining a competitive advantage over their counter-
parts who do comply with the timing requirements). For a discussion of the potential
for bad publicity and exposure to additional liability that results from EPCRA re-
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§§ 11022(a) and 11023(a), which require the annual submission of
forms,12 thereby providing a basis for the argument that companies
also need to comply with the timing provisions in order to avoid a
citizen suit. The answer is critical, for if companies need only
complete the required forms prior to the filing of a suit, the citizen-
suit provision is meaningless and gives no incentive for the Davids
of the environmental arena to initiate enforcement proceedings.
Several courts have sought to resolve the difficult issue of
whether citizens may sue for wholly past violations of the Act-
infractions that continue after rogue facilities receive the required
sixty-day notice letter from citizens intending to bring suit but are
corrected before an EPCRA suit is filed 3 Three federal district
courts addressed the matter, each holding that citizens may sue
facilities under the Act for past failures to comply with the report-
ing provisions of the statute that are cured before the actual suit is
filed.1 4  In 1995, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reached a different result in Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc.
v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc. 15 Unlike the three dis-
trict court decisions, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the "plain lan-
guage and structure of EPCRA lead us to conclude that citizen
plaintiffs may not bring actions ...for purely historical viola-
tions."16 Thus, the Atlantic States opinion construed the EPCRA
citizen-suit provision in a way that diminished the might of the
citizen suit in EPCRA enforcement.
Recently the issue of EPCRA citizen suits was muddied yet
again when the Seventh Circuit, in Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment v. Steel Co.,17 held that citizens could sue for past violations
under the Act even after violators had submitted overdue filings."8
porting, see discussion infra notes 265-74 and accompanying text.
12. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11022(a)(2), 11023(a). "[Hazardous chemical] inventory
form[s] ... shall be submitted on or before March 1, 1988, and annually thereafter on
March 1, and shall contain data with respect to the preceding calendar year," id. §
11022(a)(2), while "toxic chemical release form[s] ... shall be submitted ... on or
before July 1, 1988, and annually thereafter on July 1 and shall contain data reflect-
ing releases during the preceding calendar year." Id. § 11023(a).
13. See Falkenberry, supra note 8, at 19 n.98.
14. See Delaware Valley, 813 F. Supp. at 1141; Williams v. Leybold Tech., Inc.,
784 F. Supp. 765, 770 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting
Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. 745,753 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
15. 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995).
16. Id. at 478.
17. 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3581 (U.S. Feb. 25,
1997) (No. 96-643).
18. See id. at 1244.
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The court found that this interpretation was consistent with the
legislative intent underlying EPCRA, 9 conformed to the most
natural reading of the statute's wording,2 and gave meaning to the
citizen-suit provision as a whole.21 The Citizens decision resolved
the issue of citizen suits under the Act consistent with the previous
district court decisions but contrary to the Sixth Circuit's interpre-
tation. Therefore, a split exists among the circuits on the issue of
citizen suits under EPCRA. Recently, the United States Supreme
Court granted review of the Citizens decision7 and will soon de-
termine which of the two courts' interpretations of the provision is
correct. In order to ensure that EPCRA's provisions are given full
effect and substance, the Supreme Court must conclude that citi-
zens can hold facilities liable for all violations, past or present, and
thereby discourage corporations from contravening EPCRA's
mandates.
This Comment examines the debate and proposes a solution
to the split among the circuits. Part II surveys the purposes and
provisions of EPCRA and summarizes the district court decisions
preceding the circuit courts' conflicting opinions. Part III ad-
dresses the circuit split by first examining the rationale of the Sixth
Circuit in the Atlantic States decision and then scrutinizing the
Citizens decision by the Seventh Circuit. After describing the
sources of the circuit split, Part III identifies the common ground
shared by the two decisions, which is the reliance by both courts on
the 1987 Supreme Court case, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. 3 In Gwaltney the Court con-
fronted citizen suits for past violations of the Clean Water Act
24
and thereby set a precedent for future cases related to citizen-suit
provisions contained in environmental statutes. Part IV employs
the Gwaltney methodology to resolve the EPCRA citizen-suit is-
sue. Finally, this Comment concludes that the proper resolution of
the citizen-suit issue permits citizens to bring suits for wholly past
violations of EPCRA.
19. See id. at 1243 n.2.
20. See id. at 1242-44.
21. See id. at 1244.
22. See 65 U.S.L.W. 3581 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997) (No. 96-643).
23. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
24. See id. at 52-56. The Clean Water Act is codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1994).
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II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT
A. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
of 1986
1. Reasons underlying the act's passage
In 1986 Congress enacted EPCRA as an independent law
found in Title III of a more comprehensive environmental enact-
ment, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA).2 EPCRA furthers two distinct but equally impor-
tant purposes. First, each state must establish state and local
emergency planning bodies to promulgate emergency response
plans in the event of accidental chemical releases from industrial
facilities.27 Second, industrial facilities must compile accurate in-
formation disclosing the use, storage, and release of toxic chemi-
cals at their premises and must make such information readily
available to the public.?
Congress enacted EPCRA for several reasons. First, the Act
was a reaction to the 1984 international disaster in Bhopal, India,
when a toxic chemical release at a Union Carbide pesticide plant
killed over 2000 people.29 Considered one of the worst industrial
disasters of modem times, the tragedy occurred when forty-five
tons of the toxic chemical methyl isocyanate leaked from a faulty
storage tank." Subsequent reports revealed that a plant inspection
made two years prior to the spill discovered "ten potentially major
safety deficiencies, as well as a number of other irregularities."3
In hindsight, many officials attributed the disaster to those prob-
lems.32
During congressional floor debate prior to the Act's passage,
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050.
26. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.,
26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
27. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11005. This requirement constitutes the "Emergency
Planning" component of the Act. See Falkenberry, supra note 8, at 4-5.
28. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-11047. This composes the "Community Right-to-
Know" component of the Act. See Falkenberry, supra note 8, at 8.
29. See Steven J. Christiansen & Stephen H. Urquhart, The Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act of 1986: Analysis and Update, 6 BYU J. PUB. L.
235,235 (1992).
30. See Pico Iyer, Clouds of Uncertainty: For Bhopal and Union Carbide, the
Tragedy Continues, TIME, Dec. 24, 1984, at 24.
31. Id. at 27.
32. See id.
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EPCRA sponsors reiterated concerns that the Bhopal tragedy had
raised:
We are but one short year from Bhopal, India. A leaky
storage tank, an early morning emergency, . . . a pall of
white smoke that spread with the wind, poisoning human
beings as if they were insects. Over 2,000 people died,
over 200,000 people were maimed or injured. Bhopal was
in India, but it was an American company operating in a
replica of an American plant.33
Indeed, the Bhopal disaster had significant international repercus-
sions,34 such as motivating Congress to seek a means of avoiding
such a tragedy closer to home.35
A second event prompting Congress to pass EPCRA was an-
other chemical release after Bhopal that reinforced the need for
emergency release provisions. In 1985 a leak at the Union Carbide
plant in Institute, West Virginia, formed a toxic gas cloud over the
community, sending almost 200 residents to seek medical atten-
36tion. The company attributed the leak to a valve failure caused
by a buildup of pressure in a storage tank containing 500 pounds of
aldicarb oxime, a 3as derived from the chemical that had leaked at
the Bhopal plant.3 Investigators were even more alarmed to learn
that the West Virginia plant had only recently resumed production
after a five-month closure for installation of five million dollars in
safety equipment, a response to the Bhopal disaster.38 As a result,
the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
communicated a "sense of urgency" in the need to tighten general
33. 131 CONG. REc. 34,763 (1985) (statement of Rep. Gerry E. Sikorski (D-
Minn.)).
34. See Jayadev Chowdhury, Bhopal, a Year Later: Learning from a Tragedy,
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Dec. 9, 1985, at 14. "Many Bhopal-inspired laws, covering
such aspects as stricter controls and penalties on accidental emissions, emergency-
response procedures and community right-to-know laws, have been making headway
in legislatures throughout the world." Id. For example, in the Tarragona and
Huelva regions of Spain, where more than half of the country's chemical industries
are located, concern about chemical hazards led to pressure from various communi-
ties to hurry the adoption of an environmental safety plan that had been in progress
for three years. See id.
35. See 131 CONG. REC. 34,640 (1985) (statement of Rep. M. G. (Gene) Snyder
(R-Ky.)) ("In response to the Bhopal ... cris[i]s, [the Act] provides for comprehen-
sive community right-to-know and emergency response programs.").
36. See Karen Tumulty, Scores Hurt by Leaking Chemicals: Faulty Valve Cited at
Union Carbide's West Virginia Plant, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 1985, at Al.
37. See id.
38. See id.
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39safety measures.
A third reason motivating Congress to pass EPCRA was the
gravity of the problem: studies had shown that the number of
chemical accidents in the United States was significant. One 1985
publication claimed that "[i]n America ... 60,000 chemicals are
produced in over 6,000 communities and last year alone we had
5,700 toxic chemical accidents." 4 Prior to the Bhopal and Institute
disasters, no comprehensive national plan existed that could pro-
vide the government and, more importantly, citizens with impor-
tant information concerning hazardous chemicals in their commu-
nities as well as methods of protection in the event of an
41emergency.
The potential for another Bhopal in the United States was
alarmingly real.42 The two disasters and the toxic chemical statis-
tics motivated Congress to pass EPCRA, a law that would
"provide for the development of local emergency response plans..
S[,] give important information.., about hazardous chemicals pre-
sent at facilities... [,] [a]nd... require that people be informed of
hazardous chemicals that are present in their communities." 43
2. EPCRA's key provisions
a. emergency planning and notification
EPCRA consists of three distinct sets of provisions.44 First,
39. Under a Noxious Cloud of Fear: A Toxic Gas Leak Rocks "Chemical Valley"
Residents, TIME, Aug. 26, 1985, at 13.
40. 131 CONG. REC. 34,763 (1985) (statement of Rep. Gerry E. Sikorski (D-
Minn.)).
41. Three significant statutes enacted prior to SARA and EPCRA address haz-
ardous waste: the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692
(1994); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992(k); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. Although each statute regulates the
testing, storage, management, and clean-up of toxic and hazardous wastes, none re-
quire public disclosure of the presence of hazardous waste at premises or provide
emergency planning in the event of hazardous substance mismanagement.
42. See Jayne S.A. Pritchard, A Closer Look at Title III of SARA: Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 203,
203-05 (1988) (discussing the concern that no federal agency had authority over the
types of chemical releases similar to that which had occurred in Bhopal despite the
fact that numerous toxic chemical accidents had occurred in the United States be-
tween 1980-1985 and had resulted in many deaths and injuries).
43. 132 CONG. REc. 29,761 (1986) (statement of Rep. Al Swift (D-Wash.)).
44. Subchapter I, containing emergency planning and notification provisions, is
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11005; Subchapter II, consisting of reporting require-
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the emergency planning and notification provisions require each
governor to establish state commissions, planning districts, and lo-
cal committees 45 all of which are instructed to develop emergency
response plans in the event of chemical releases.4' In turn, facili-
ties that produce, use, or store hazardous chemicals are required to
provide notice to the local emergency planning committees that
they are subject to EPCRA's emergency planning provisions.47
The facilities must also give immediate notice in the event of any
release of either an extremely hazardous substance as defined in
EPCRA or a nonextremely hazardous substance that nonetheless
requires notification under other environmental statutes.48
b. reporting requirements
The second important component of EPCRA is the commu-
nity right-to-know subchapter, which is composed of the various
reporting requirements. Prior to EPCRA's passage, the reporting
requirements subchapter was hailed during floor debates as the
best means of preventing another Bhopal.49 The provisions specify
ments, is codified at id. §§ 11021-11023; Subchapter III, containing general provi-
sions, is codified at itd §§ 11041-11050.
45. See id. § 11001. At 42 U.S.C. § 11001(c), which obligates the state emergency
response commissions to establish local emergency planning committees, EPCRA
requires each planning committee to include owners and operators of facilities sub-
ject to EPCRA's requirements. See iU2 § 11001(c).
46. See id. § 11003.
47. See id. § 11002(c). A facility is subject to the requirements of the Act if an
"extremely hazardous substance" is present at the facility in an amount that exceeds
an established threshold planning quantity. See id. § 11002(b). "Extremely hazard-
ous substance" is defined as a substance present on a list published by the adminis-
trator of the EPA. See idU § 11002(a). This same list was published in 1985 in the
Appendix of the Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program Interim Guidance.
See id. § 11002(a)(2). EPCRA defines the threshold planning quantity of each sub-
stance, stating that "the Administrator shall publish an interim final regulation es-
tablishing a threshold planning quantity for each substance on the [extremely haz-
ardous substances] list, taking into account ... the toxicity, reactivity, volatility,
dispersability, combustability, or flammability of a substance." Id. § 11002(a)(3), (4).
48. See id. § 11004. Specifically, this provision refers to substances not consid-
ered extremely hazardous but which nonetheless merit notification under section
103(a) of CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (requiring persons to notify authorities
immediately of any release of a hazardous substance in quantities as mandated in 42
U.S.C. § 9602).
49. See 131 CONG. REC. 34,759 (1985) (statement of Rep. Bob Edgar (D-Pa.)).
As Pennsylvania Representative Bob Edgar stated in floor debate:
Now, in the aftermath of Bhopal and Institute, WV, we have become much
more aware of the fact that many Americans are exposed on a daily basis to
hazardous substances that can cause cancer and other long-term health
problems ....
[Vol. 30:1667
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three required documents, which facility owners or operators must
prepare: (1) material safety data sheets, (2) emergency and haz-
ardous chemical inventory forms, and (3) toxic chemical release
forms." Further, EPCRA provides that owners and operators
must prepare or make available material safety data sheets for
each hazardous chemical present at their facilities.5' These docu-
ments, which include lists of the chemical names and their hazard-
ous components,52 must be available to the public upon request. 3
The owner or operator of a facility that must prepare material
safety data sheets must also file an emergency and hazardous
chemical inventory form. 4 These inventory forms contain either
"Tier I" or "Tier II" information.5 5 Tier I information, which is the
minimum data required on such forms, includes (1) an estimate of
the maximum amount of hazardous chemicals present at a facility
at any time during the calendar year; (2) an estimate of the aver-
age daily amount of such chemicals; and (3) the general location of
the substances at the facility.56 Tier II information, which must be
provided only upon the request of state or local emergency plan-
ning committees, comprises (1) Tier I information; (2) a descrip-
tion of the storage mechanism for each chemical; and (3) an indi-
cation of whether the owner wishes to withhold location
Information about these health dangers is the basis of the right-to-know
concept.
Id.; see also id. at 34,762 (statement of Rep. James J. Florio (D-N.J.)) ("[T]here is a
very important function to be served by our long-term emission data records that we
are going to keep to let the community know that we get information as to annual
emissions of chronic as well as acute contaminants."). These remarks relate to the
debate on the Edgar amendment to this subchapter, an amendment that expanded
the reporting requirements to include substances that are known to cause or are sus-
pected of causing chronic health effects in humans. See id at 34,758. The amend-
ment passed and is now reflected in 42 U.S.C. §§ 11002(a)(4) and 11023(d)(2)(B).
"[Tlhe list shall take into account... any short- or long-term health effect which may
result from a short-term exposure to the substance." 42 U.S.C. § 11002(a)(4)
(emphasis added).
50. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-11023.
51. See id. § 11021(a). The hazardous chemicals referred to in this provision in-
clude hazardous chemicals under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994), as well as other chemicals that fall below a
threshold established by the Administrator. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021(a)(1), (b).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 11021(a)(2)(A).
53. See id. § 11021(c)(2).
54. See id. § 11022(a)(1).
55. See id. § 11022(d).
56. See id § 11022(d)(1)(B).
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information from public disclosure. 7 EPCRA also requires that
"[t]he [emergency and hazardous chemical] inventory form . . .
shall be submitted on or before March 1, 1988, and annually there-
after on March 1, and shall contain data with respect to the preced-
ing calendar year."58 The emergency and hazardous chemical in-
ventory forms are a straightforward and significant element in
EPCRA's reporting requirements.
The final reporting requirement is a toxic chemical release
form. Again, the purpose is to inform planning committees as well
as the public of potential hazards. The owner or operator of a fa-
cility must complete a toxic chemical release form for each toxic
chemical released, whether by intentional use or by accident, into
any environmental media in quantities exceeding an established
threshold quantity.9 Like the requirement for the inventory
forms, EPCRA also contains a strict timing requirement for the
toxic chemical release forms.9 These forms are made available to
the public by a computerized database, which the EPA prepares
and maintains. This database, called the Toxics Release Inven-
tory (TRI),62 is the "first chemical-specific, multi-media accounting
of toxic releases . .. ever mandated by federal law."63 Finally,
EPCRA delineates the various uses for these reporting forms: to
inform the public about toxic releases, to assist in research, and to
aid in the development of appropriate standards and guidelines."
Compliance with each of these reporting requirements is integral
to fulfilling EPCRA's purposes.
c. general provisions
The third and final subchapter of EPCRA contains provisions
57. See id. § 11022(d)(2), (e).
58. Id. § 11022(a)(2).
59. See id. § '11023(a). The threshold amounts are 10,000 pounds for toxic
chemicals used at a facility and 25,000 to 75,000 pounds for toxic chemicals manufac-
tured or processed at a facility, depending on when the toxic chemical release form
must be submitted. See id. § 11023(f)(1)(A), (B).
60. See id. § 11023(a) ("Such form shall be submitted ... on or before July 1,
1988, and annually thereafter on July I .. .
61. See id. § 110230).
62. See David J. Abell, Comment, Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know: The Toxics Release Inventory, 47 SMU L. REv. 581,582 (1994).
63. Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the Public Right to Know: The
Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 11
J. LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. 217,230 (1996).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(h).
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that apply generally to the entire Act. Among these are provisions
for "trade secret" protection;" a provision that health professionals
may access confidential chemical information in order to provide
medical treatment;" and a multitude of enforcement and liability
67measures.
Under the EPCRA enforcement provisions, federal, state, and
local governments, as well as citizens, may compel facilities to con-
form to the statute's various requirements.6 For example, the
EPA Administrator, on behalf of the United States, may order
facility owners or operators to comply with the statute's emer-
gency planning requirements.69 Failure to comply may result in li-
ability of up to $25,000 for each day in which a violation occurs or
failure to comply continues.7' Furthermore, facilities are subject to
civil, administrative, and criminal penalties for failure to comply
with the emergency notification provision.7' The enforcement
provisions also impose similar civil and administrative penalties for
violations of the various reporting requirements.2
One of the enforcement provisions confers authority on state
and local governments and citizens to bring civil actions.73 Prior to
the commencement of any such action, notice must be given to
both the facility and the EPA,74 which must not have initiated a
similar proceeding.75 Another significant aspect of the enforce-
65. See id. § 11042. The trade-secret provision allows facilities to withhold in-
formation about the "specific chemical identity" of a hazardous substance if such in-
formation is a "trade secret" as defined in the section. See id. § 11042(a)(1)(A),
(2)(A). If such information meets the requirements, the only information a facility
must supply is a "generic class or category" of the hazardous substance or chemical.
See id. § 11042(a)(1)(B).
66. See id. § 11043. This section provides that upon request facilities must pro-
vide health professionals with the specific chemical identities of a toxic substance if
the professional provides a written statement of need and an agreement for confi-
dentiality. See id § 11043(a). A statement of need must assert that such information
is needed for diagnosis or treatment. See id. § 11043(a)(1). In addition, such infor-
mation must be available if a medical official determines that a medical emergency
exists or that preventative measures are necessary. See id. § 11043(b)-(c).
67. See id. §§ 11045-11046.
68. See id.
69. See id. § 11045(a) (referring to §§ 11002(c), 11003).
70. See id.
71. See id. § 11045(b). The emergency notification provision is discussed supra
note 48 and accompanying text.
72. See id. § 11045(c).
73. See id. § 11046(a).
74. See id. § 11046(d).
75. See id. § 11046(e) ("No action may be commenced ... if the Administrator
1677June 1997]
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ment provisions is the discretion of courts, in issuing any final or-
der, to award costs of litigation to the "prevailing or the substan-
tially prevailing party" should such an award be appropriate. 6
Thus, the provisions provide substantial liability and establish a
variety of enforcement mechanisms, which discourage corpora-
tions from violating EPCRA's requirements.
The EPA considers the enforcement provisions "an important
vehicle" in attaining full compliance with EPCRA.2 Unfortu-
nately, given the sheer number of potentially liable facilities, the
EPA lacks the resources to single-handedly assure complete en-
forcement.78 Therefore, a potent citizen-suit provision in EPCRA
is crucial to furthering the EPA's goals.
3. The citizen-suit provision
The citizen-suit provision of EPCRA authorizes citizens, or
"any person" as designated by the provision, to bring civil en-
forcement actions. 9 The provision, permitting citizen suits against
has commenced and is diligently pursuing an administrative order or civil action to
enforce the requirement concerned or to impose a civil penalty ... with respect to
the violation of the requirement.").
76. Id. § 11046(0. These costs of litigation include reasonable attorney and ex-
pert witness fees. See id.
77. Press Release from the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Seeks $2.8
Million for Toxic Chemicals Release Reporting Violations 1 (June 3, 1993) (on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (stating that enforcement actions
"reflect EPA's determination to vigorously enforce the data reporting requirements
of our environmental laws .... Only through an active and informed public can we
protect human health and our natural resources. These reporting requirements are
an important vehicle for this and must be enforced." (quoting EPA Administrator
Carol M. Browner)); see also Falkenberry, supra note 8, at 2 ("The [EPA], realizing
the importance of full compliance with EPCRA, has undergone an aggressive cam-
paign .. .to enforce all requirements."). But see Wolf, supra note 63, at 270-76
(stating that while EPCRA's reach is far, its enforcement has been negligible, with
the overwhelming tendency toward settlement).
78. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REc. 34,637 (1985) (statement of Rep. James J. Florio
(D-N.J.)) ("If EPA were aggressively implementing the existing law, many of the
provisions of this bill would be unnecessary. But EPA has performed poorly ....");
Falkenberry, supra note 8, at 2 ("Unfortunately, it is estimated that there are several
million facilities subject to EPCRA reporting requirements. The EPA simply lacks
the resources to assure total enforcement over all facilities." (footnote omitted)).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1). These citizen suits are divided into four groups of
actions based upon the particular defendant's identity. In particular, the four groups
of civil actions are against: (1) an owner or operator of a facility for failure to comply
with the various requirements of the statute; (2) the Administrator of the EPA for
failure to fulfill his or her duties under the Act; (3) the Administrator, a state gover-
nor, or a state emergency response commission for failure to provide a mechanism
for public availability of information; and (4) a state governor or state emergency
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facilities to enforce EPCRA's provisions, states that
any person may commence a civil action on his own be-
half against... :
(A) An owner or operator of a facility for failure to do any
of the following:
(i) Submit a followup emergency notice under section
11004(c) of this title.
(ii) Submit a material safety data sheet or a list under
section 11021(a) of this title.
(iii) Complete and submit an inventory form under sec-
tion 11022(a) of this title containing tier [sic] I informa-
tion as described in section 11022(d)(1) of this title un-
less such requirement does not apply by reason of the
second sentence of section 11022(a)(2) of this title.
(iv) Complete and submit a toxic chemical release form
under section 11023(a) of this title.8"
Despite the citizen-suit provision's specific language, several
issues illustrate the inherent ambiguities of the statute.
81
One such issue over which courts disagree is the meaning of
the phrase "failure to . . . [c]omplete and submit" the forms re-
quired by EPCRA.2 The dispute has generated two distinct inter-
pretations: (1) facility owners or operators are liable for failure to
complete and submit the required forms annually-in other words,
facilities may be liable for wholly past violations of the reporting
requirements; and (2) owners or operators may escape liability by
backfiling-completing and submitting any forms that have not
been filed on an annual basis-any time prior to the commence-
ment of a citizen's enforcement action. 3 This dispute over the in-
response commission for failure to respond to a request for Tier II information. See
id. § 11046(a)(1)(A)-(D). This Comment does not address each group of actions but
focuses primarily upon civil actions against owners or operators of a facility.
80. Id. § 11046(a)(1)(A).
81. Among these issues are: what constitutes an "injury in fact" under EPCRA;
whether the citizen suit constitutes an unlawful delegation of executive power in con-
travention of the separation-of-powers doctrine and the Appointments Clause of the
Constitution; whether attorney fees may be recovered; and what amount of research
and discovery is required for citizens to identify EPCRA violations properly. For a
discussion of the case law on each of these issues, see Falkenberry, supra note 8, at
16-21, and Shavelson, supra note 11, at 33-35.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv).
83. See discussion infra Parts III.A (discussing the Sixth Circuit decision), III.B
(discussing the Seventh Circuit's holding).
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terpretation of facility liability under citizen actions confronted the
Sixth Circuit in Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. United
Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc.84 and the Seventh Circuit Court
in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co. 5 The two deci-
sions yielded a critical conflict that must be resolved if the citizen-
suit provision is to have any consistent and substantive meaning in
the future.
B. The District Courts' Interpretations of EPCRA's
Citizen-Suit Provision
Before the Sixth and Seventh Circuits confronted the citizen-
suit issue, three district courts had interpreted the EPCRA provi-
sion. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up
Door Manufacturing Corp.86 was the first opinion to address the is-
sue of citizen suits for wholly past reporting violations. In that
case, Atlantic States Legal Foundation, a citizens' environmental
organization, brought an action against Whiting Roll-Up Door
Manufacturing, an industrial facility, alleging that the defendant
had failed to submit information in a timely manner as required by
EPCRA."' Specifically, it claimed that Whiting failed to comply
with the reporting requirements in 1987, 1988, and 1989.8 Atlantic
States conceded that the defendant had filed all required informa-
tion as of the date of suit but maintained that EPCRA authorizes a
citizen suit to recover civil penalties even when the defendant has
"'come into' compliance . . . before the plaintiff commenced
suit."89 The defendant moved to dismiss and argued that the court
lacked jurisdiction because the defendant had complied with the
reporting provisions prior to the suit's commencement. 90
The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.91 The
court held that, "based on the statute's plain language and the leg-
islation's underlying purpose, which is well documented by its leg-
islative history," EPCRA does indeed "authorize citizen suits for
reporting violations which are not continuing at the time the law-
84. 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995).
85. 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996) cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3581 (U.S. Feb. 25,
1997) (No. 96-643).
86. 772 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
87. See id. at 746.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
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suit is filed." 92
The issue of EPCRA citizen suits for wholly past reporting
violations appeared again in Williams v. Leybold Technologies,
Inc.93 In Williams, plaintiff Christopher Williams, a former process
technician at the Leybold facility, sued Leybold and alleged that
the facility had failed to timely submit a Material Safety Data
Sheet as required by EPCRA for the nickel and nickel compounds
that the facility used in its manufacturing operations9 Again, the
defendant argued that because it was no longer in violation of the
EPCRA requirements, Williams had no statutory authority for
bringing a citizen suit.95
The Williams court followed the lead of the Whiting court,
which had looked to the legislative history and explicit text of
EPCRA to determine the meaning of the citizen-suit provision.
In doing so, the Williams court concluded that "the legislative his-
tory and the plain language of the statute compel the conclusion
that past violations are not exempt from EPCRA's citizen suit [sic]
provisions."' 7
In 1993 a third district court addressed the EPCRA citizen-
suit issue. The court in Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-
Hastings, Inc.98 responded to the defendant's assertion that the
court had no jurisdiction over wholly past violations of EPCRA,
agreeing with the holdings of the Whiting and Williams courts.9
The Kurz-Hastings court held that "42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) does
provide the federal courts with jurisdiction for wholly past viola-
tions of... EPCRA"1 ° and that citizens could bring suit for past
failures to comply even if the defendant had complied with
92. Id. at 749.
93. 784 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
94. See id. at 766. EPCRA's citizen-suit provision allows any person to bring an
action against an owner or operator for failure to "[s]ubmit a material safety data
sheet or a list under section 11021(a) of th[e] title." 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(A)(ii)
(1994).
95. See Williams, 784 F. Supp. at 767-68.
96. See Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 749.
97. Williams, 784 F. Supp. at 768.
98. 813 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
99. See id. at 1141.
100. Id. The court further validated EPCRA's citizen-suit provision by finding
that (1) the provision was a constitutional delegation of executive power since the
executive branch retained authority under the Act to commence actions against al-
leged violators and (2) citizens met standing requirements for injury-in-fact merely
by claiming they had suffered from a lack of information. See id. at 1138-40.
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EPCRA prior to the filing of the complaint.0'
After the court's decision in Kurz-Hastings, an apparent con-
sensus existed among three United States district courts in New
York, California, and Pennsylvania. That consensus appeared to
resolve the citizen-suit issue; citizens could sue for wholly past
EPCRA violations without violating the letter or spirit of the Act.
In 1995, however, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion that chal-
lenged the district court consensus of nearly four years.
III. THE CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT
A. The Sixth Circuit's Decision in Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc.
In Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. United Musical In-
struments, U.S.A., Inc.'2 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard
a citizen suit brought against a defendant for wholly past violations
of EPCRA's reporting requirements.' 3 The court disagreed with
the holdings in Whiting, Williams, and Kurz-Hastingsl' and agreed
with the defendant's argument that EPCRA does not authorize
citizen suits for past violations that have been cured by the date
the action commences. 05
1. Facts
The Atlantic States decision arose from a dispute between At-
lantic States Legal Foundation (ASLF), a nonprofit organization,' °
and United Musical Instruments, U.S.A. (UMI), an Ohio manufac-
turer of musical instruments that utilized some of the toxic chemi-
cals falling within the ambit of EPCRA.O° In July 1992 ASLF in-
formed UMI of its intention to file an enforcement action pursuant
101. See id.
102. 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995).
103. See id. at 474.
104. See discussion supra Part II.B.
105. See Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 475.
106. See id. at 474. Based in Syracuse, New York, ASLF is responsible for initiat-
ing most of the EPCRA citizen suits filed throughout the country. See Wolf, supra
note 63, at 279. ASLF filed the first citizen suit against a corporate violator in July
1990 and by April of 1992 had sent notices of intent to sue to 30 alleged EPCRA
violators. See id. at 279 & n.355. The EPA preempted several of these cases and
others settled, but those remaining contributed much to the success of EPCRA citi-
zen suits. See id. at 279-80 & nn. 355-58.
107. See Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 474.
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to EPCRA's citizen suit provision."0 ' ASLF alleged that UMI had
violated EPCRA by not filing the annually required toxic chemical
release forms from 1987 to 1990."9 Although UMI had not filed
the forms at the time it received the notice, it did respond to
ASLF's notice letter on August 21, 1992, by filing the required
forms for the years at issue with the EPA.110
ASLF filed a complaint in an Ohio federal district court
seeking declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and civil penal-
ties."' UMI responded with a motion to dismiss the complaint,
primarily arguing that the statute of limitations had run on the
claim and that the court lacked jurisdiction over ASLF's claim.
12
The court ignored the jurisdictional issue and granted the motion
to dismiss solely on the grounds that the statute of limitations
barred the claim.
11 3
2. Holding
On appeal the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision on other
grounds. Rather than relying on the statute-of-limitations argu-
ment, the court focused on the issue of citizen suits brought for
wholly past violations.14 The court concluded that "citizen plain-
tiffs may not bring actions that seek civil penalties for purely his-
torical violations. 1 1 5 Two arguments buttressed the court's con-
clusion. First, neither the plain language nor the legislative history
of the Act supported plaintiff's claim involving the defendant's
wholly past violation. Second, the court found support in an
analogous Supreme Court case, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
108. See id.
109. See id. When ASLF filed the complaint, it alleged violations for the years
1988 through 1991. See id.
110. See id.; Shavelson, supra note 11, at 35.
111. See Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 474.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 474-75; Shavelson, supra note 11, at 36. The district court has been
criticized for selecting an arbitrary statute of limitations. See Shavelson, supra note
11, at 36 (stating that the court had chosen "to ignore a long line of citizen suit [sic]
caselaw [sic] supporting the application of the federal five year limitations period").
Because EPCRA does not contain a separate statute of limitations, the plaintiff ar-
gued that the court should apply a standard federal five-year limitations period,
which would be consistent with a long line of citizen-suit case law. See id. Instead,
the court borrowed a shorter one-year statute of limitations found in Ohio state law.
See id.
114. See Shavelson, supra note 11, at 36.
115. Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 478.
116. See id. at 475,477-78.
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Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.,"' which addressed citizen suits
brought under the Clean Water Act.'
3. Reasoning
The court began by discussing the plain language of the Act.
The court stated that "[i]n determining the meaning of a statute,
we of course begin with its plain language.'. 9 The court pointed
out the clear differences in the Act between the language of §
11046(a), the citizen-suit provision, and that of § 11023(a), the
toxic chemical release form requirement. 20 On one hand, the citi-
zen-suit provision authorizes citizen suits for "failure to . . .
[c]omplete and submit [the required forms] under section 11023(a)
of [the Act].' 12' On the other hand, § 11023(a) requires submission
of the required forms annually by a specific date." The court rea-
soned, however, that the language of the citizen-suit provision sug-
gests that "only the failure to complete and submit the requireda c izn st. The cour one
forms can provide the basis for a citizen •"' urt pointed
out that, although § 11023(a) requires that forms be filed in a
timely manner, the citizen-suit provision speaks only of the com-
pletion and filing of the document.' 4 "The form is completed and
filed even when it is not timely filed."' s The court stated that the
inherent distinctions between the sections clearly supported its
holding that citizens may not sue for wholly past violations of
EPCRA.'26
After describing the differences between the two provisions,
the court discussed congressional intent and legislative history. 27
The court compared the citizen-suit provision to other provisions
of EPCRA and concluded that "[r]ather than give citizen plaintiffs
... broad power ... Congress limited citizen suits by emphasizing
117. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
118. See id. at 52.
119. Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 475.
120. See id.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(A)(iv).
122. See id. § 11023(a). "The owner or operator of a facility ... shall complete a
toxic chemical release form .... Such form shall be submitted ... on or before July
1, 1988, and annually thereafter on July 1 ... ." Id.
123. See Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 475 (emphasis added).
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 478 ("In sum, the plain language... of EPCRA lead[s] us to con-
clude" that citizen suits may not be brought for wholly past violations.).
127. See id. at 477.
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that it is the failure to submit the requisite forms that gives rise to
a citizen action. Congress did not authorize citizen suits for other
violations of § 11023."'28 Considering the plain language of each
provision of EPCRA, the court concluded that when Congress
contemplated citizen suits, it did not intend a delayed submission
of required forms to be tantamount to an outright failure to submit
the information.129
The court also addressed an argument by ASLF that
EPCRA's legislative history authorizes citizen suits for historical
violations.13 The Sixth Circuit quickly dismissed this argument,
reasoning that "[t]he only thing that is clear from [the legislative]
history... is that Congress thought it important that the public re-
ceive the required information" and that "[o]nce the forms provid-
ing the information have been filed, this congressional goal has
been achieved, and an enforcement suit is unnecessary., 13' Al-
though the court acknowledged that penalties for wholly past vio-
lations may be appropriate in some cases, the Sixth Circuit main-
tained that EPCRA's language confers upon the EPA complete
discretion to determine the necessity of such suits. 32
The second basis of the Atlantic States holding was that an
analogous Supreme Court decision, Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation,3 supported the conclusion as to the
limitations on citizen suits under EPCRA.'34 The Gwaltney Court
held that the citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act 135 does
not authorize suits for historical violations.'36 In Gwaltney the
128. Id. at 475. The court contrasted the citizen-suit provision with § 11045(c)(1),
which authorizes civil penalties against an owner or operator "who violates any re-
quirement" of § 11023, and § 11045(c)(4), which authorizes the EPA to assess and
collect "any civil penalty for which a person is liable." Id. From this language the
court concluded that Congress intended to limit the authority of citizen suits to ongo-
ing violations and to give the EPA the sole authority to seek penalties for wholly
past violations. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id at 477. The court, however, neglected to specify the legislative history
to which ASLF referred and dismissed the argument rather quickly. See id.
131. Id. For sources of the court's contention, see, for example, H.R. CoNF. REP.
No. 99-962, at 281,309-10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3374, 3402-03.
132. See Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 477. The court attributed to the EPA a "broad
perspective on the entire spectrum of enforcement and compliance," suggesting that
citizens were in no position to judge when conduct by violators warranted such pen-
alties. Id.
133. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
134. See Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 475-77.
135. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
136. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59 ("[O]ur conclusion [is] that citizens ... may seek
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Court found that the purpose of giving notice to the alleged viola-
tor was to provide the violator with an opportunity to bring itself
into compliance and therefore render a citizen suit unnecessary.137
The Supreme Court further held that to allow citizen suits for
purely historical violations would contravene the purpose of the
Clean Water Act's enforcement provisions-that "the citizen suit
is meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental ac-
tion. '
The Sixth Circuit analogized the enforcement provisions of
the Clean Water Act to those contained in EPCRA.'39 In doing so
the court reiterated that citizen suits are to be a secondary en-
forcement mechanism only'4° and that permitting citizen enforce-
ment suits for wholly past violations "would render superfluous
EPCRA's requirement of sixty-days' notice to the alleged viola-
tor.' 141  Thus, bolstered by the Supreme Court's rationale in a
comparable case under the Clean Water Act, the court in Atlantic
States concluded that citizen suits for past EPCRA violations were
prohibited.1
41
The Atlantic States opinion thereby departed from the three
district court decisions, which had held that citizen suits for past
EPCRA violations are consistent with the language and underly-
civil penalties only in a suit brought to enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing viola-
tion." (emphasis added)).
137. See id. at 59-60. As the Supreme Court stated, "[i]f we assume... that citi-
zen suits may target wholly past violations, the requirement of notice to the alleged
violator becomes gratuitous." Id at 60. This sentiment was subsequently echoed by
the Supreme Court in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 33 (1989), which
held the 60-day notice requirement to be a mandatory precondition for commencing
a citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k).
138. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. The Court felt that such purpose was supported by
the Act's bar on citizen suits when governmental enforcement action is already un-
derway. See id.
139. See Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 476-77. In fact, the Clean Water Act and
EPCRA have similar notice and citizen enforcement provisions. See 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a)-(b) (containing the authorization/jurisdiction and notice subdivisions of the
Clean Water Act, which are comparable to EPCRA's citizen-suit and notice provi-
sions, located at 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1), (d)). As discussed infra Part IV.A, how-
ever, the provisions are distinguishable by their plain statutory language and by their
underlying purposes.
140. See Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 477 ("Congress envisioned citizen suits as pri-
marily a means to enforce EPCRA when a violation continues because the EPA has
failed to enforce the Act.").
141. Id
142. See id. at 478.
ing purposes of the Act.1 41 The Sixth Circuit's decision was contro-
versial. Commentators criticized the decision,'45 and the opinion
was subsequently rejected in the most recent case addressing
EPCRA citizen suits, the Seventh Circuit Court's decision in Citi-
zens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co.14
B. The Seventh Circuit's Decision in Citizens for a Better
Environment v. Steel Co.
In a comprehensive opinion, the Seventh Circuit held that
EPCRA authorizes citizen suits not only for the failure to com-
plete and submit required forms but also for the failure to do so in
a timely manner, as required by the sections referenced in the citi-
zen-suit provision.147 The court explicitly rejected the holding of
the Sixth Circuit's Atlantic States decision and thereby created a
clear split among the circuit courts.
1. Facts
Citizens involved a dispute between Citizens for a Better En-
vironment (CBE), a nonprofit environmental organization, and
The Steel Company (TSC), a manufacturer of steel located in Chi-
cago, Illinois.1  In March 1995 CBE discovered that TSC was re-
sponsible for several violations of EPCRA's reporting require-
ments, specifically the mandatory filing of inventory forms and
toxic chemical release forms.149 As required by the citizen-suit
143. See discussion supra Part II.B.
144. As discussed infra Part IV.C, by validating a violator's ability to file required
forms at any time, the decision threatens the future of the public's right to be in-
formed about chemical hazards.
145. See, e.g., Shavelson, supra note 11, at 35-38; cf. Matthew J. Smith, Note,
"Thou Shalt Not Violate!": Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
Authorizes Citizen Suits for Wholly Past Violations-Atlantic States Legal Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing Corp., 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
1051, 1079-80 (1993) (praising the decision in Whiting, which the court in Atlantic
States soundly rejected, as one that would "greatly enhance and buttress EPCRA's
utility and enforcement").
146. 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3581 (U.S. Feb. 25,
1997) (No. 96-643).
147. See id. at 1243.
148. See id at 1241.
149. See id. Specifically, CBE "alleged that [TSC] used and released toxic chemi-
cals covered by the EPCRA reporting requirements, and didn't. .. submit an inven-
tory form as required by [42 U.S.C. § 11022] or a toxic chemical release form as re-
quired by [42 U.S.C. § 11023]." Id.
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provision,' CBE gave TSC notice of its intent to sue, alleging that
TSC used and released hazardous chemicals that were covered by
EPCRA but failed to submit either an inventory form or a toxic
chemical release form.' 5' TSC responded to the notice by promptly
filing its overdue forms with the appropriate agencies, but CBE
proceeded to file its complaint in federal district court anyway.5 2
TSC filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing
that CBE's claims were based on wholly past violations and thus
were not authorized by EPCRA's provisions.5 3 In response CBE
argued that Congress did not intend for such a narrow reading of
the citizen-suit provision, citing the several district court cases that
had allowed citizen suits for past reporting violations.) The dis-
trict court dismissed the case, agreeing with TSC's interpretation
of EPCRA's citizen suit g9rovision in light of the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Atlantic States.
CBE appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. Several amicus curiae briefs, including one by the
United States,'56 were filed in support of CBE's interpretation of
the citizen-suit provision. '57 The court addressed the question of
"whether citizens may seek penalties against EPCRA violators
who file after the statutory deadline, after receiving notice of in-
tent to sue, but before a complaint may be filed in the district
court. , ,58
2. Reasoning
The Seventh Circuit began its opinion by addressing the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Atlantic States.' The court criticized the de-
150. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(d)(1) (1994) ("No action may be commenced under sub-
section (a)(1)(A) ... prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the al-
leged violation to... the alleged violator.").
151. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1241.
152. See id.
153. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., No. 95-C-4534, 1995 WL 758122,
at *2 (N.D. III. Dec. 21, 1995).
154. See id. at *3.
155. See id. at *4.
156. In its brief, the Department of Justice argued that-unless overturned-the
district court's decision would severely inhibit compliance with EPCRA and would
place additional burdens on the already scarce enforcement resources of the EPA.
See Court Overturns Controversial Right-to-Know Citizen Suit Decision, INSIDE
CALIEPA, Aug. 9, 1996, at 13.
157. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1241.
158. Id. at 1242.
159. See id. at 1241-42.
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cision principally on the grounds that the court's reliance on
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.1"
was inappropriate.61 The Sixth Circuit erred in applying the literal
holding of Gwaltney by analogy to EPCRA's citizen-suit provi-
sion." 2 As the court pointed out, each district court that had pre-
viously considered EPCRA's citizen-suit provision distinguished
Gwaltney on the basis of the inherent differences in the language
of the two statutes that precluded a legitimate analogy."' In its
analysis the Seventh Circuit used different reasoning than that of
the Sixth Circuit, which appeared to borrow the literal holding of
Gwaltney.164 Instead, the Seventh Circuit chose to apply the inter-
pretive methodology of Gwaltney. This approach focuses on the
plain meaning of a provision first, then turns to the legislative his-
tory for additional evidence of the statute's meaning.
1 66
Criticizing the Sixth Circuit's reliance on Gwaltney, the Sev-
enth Circuit noted the inherent differences between the language
in the citizen enforcement provisions of the Clean Water Act and
EPCRA.'67 The Clean Water Act is primarily worded in the pre-
sent tense,68 whereas EPCRA's enforcement provisions are not.169
The court underscored the Gwaltney Court's conclusion that,
based on the "undeviating use" of the present verb tense through-
160. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
161. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1242.
162. See id-
163. See id. at 1243. For a brief discussion of the distinctions between the Clean
Water Act and EPCRA, see infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
164. See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A.,
Inc., 61 F.3d 473, 475-77 (6th Cir. 1995). The Sixth Circuit rejected the
"hypertechnical parsing of the language of [EPCRA and the Clean Water Act]," id.
at 477, and rather than look closely at the specific language of the EPCRA provision,
chose instead to embrace the reasoning of Gwaltney as to why citizen suits for wholly
past violations were inappropriate. See id. at 476-77.
165. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1242. In doing so the court examined EPCRA in light
of the criteria used by the Gwaltney Court, beginning with a reading of the statute's
plain meaning. See id. For the court's analysis of EPCRA's plain meaning, see infra
notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
166. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56-63.
167. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1242-44.
168. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f) (allowing citizens to bring suit for a permit vio-
lation "which is in effect" (emphasis added)); id § 1365(h) (permitting a governor to
sue under the guise of a citizen when an infraction "is occurring... and is causing an
adverse effect on the public health or welfare" (emphasis added)).
169. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b)(1) (stipulating that citizen suits "shall be
brought in the district . . . in which the alleged violation occurred" (emphasis
added)); id. § 11046(d)(1) (mandating that notice of intent to sue be given to "the
State in which the alleged violation occurs" (emphasis added)).
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out the Clean Water Act, "the harm sought to be addressed by the
citizen suit lies in the present or the future, not in the past.' 170 In
contrast, EPCRA is not limited to the "'is occurring' language of
the Clean Water Act. 71  "The presence of such language in the
[Clean Water Act] shows that Congress knows how to require al-
legations of an ongoing violation as a condition of a citizen suit
when it sees fit."' The court concluded that (1) the absence of
language limiting citizen suits to ongoing violations and (2) the in-
clusion of language referring to past violations signified that
EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for purely historical violations.173
The Seventh Circuit also criticized the Sixth Circuit's conten-
tion that allowing citizen suits for wholly past violations renders
EPCRA's sixty-day notice provision superfluous.74 The court rea-
soned that permitting citizen suits "even after violators have sub-
mitted overdue filings does not render the notice provision gratui-
tous."'75 The requirement of notice (1) "gives an alleged violator a
chance to correct the citizen's information if the citizen is mistaken
about the existence of a violation,"' 76 (2) "gives a violator the op-
portunity to limit its exposure by filing late reports,"'7 (3)
"preserves the EPA's enforcement discretion, and (4)
"conserves resources by giving violators [an] opportunity and...
incentive to enter into settlement negotiations." 9 Thus, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that allowing citizen suits for historical violations
is consistent with EPCRA's requirement of notice.8
The court also focused on the plain language of the citizen-suit
provision 8' and declared that Congress intended for the words
170. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59.
171. Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1243-44 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h)).
172. Id. at 1244.
173. See id.
174. See Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 477.
175. Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244.
176. Id.
177. Id. The notice requirement limits exposure because, according to EPCRA,
"each day in which [a] violation occurs or ... failure to comply continues" is a sepa-
rate violation carrying additional penalties. 42 U.S.C. § 11045(a).
178. Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244. As required by the notice provisions, "[n]o action
may be commenced.., prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the al-
leged violation to the Administrator [of the EPA]." 42 U.S.C. § 11046(d)(1). Ac-
cordingly, such notice gives the EPA an opportunity to take enforcement action or
decline to act if it so chooses. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244.
179. Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244.
180. See id.
181. "[A]ny person may commence a civil action ... against... [a]n owner or op-
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"under section 11022(a) of this title"'' and "under section
11023(a) of this title"' to carry independent significance."' As the
court stated, "[t]he most natural reading of 'under' a section is 'in
accordance with the requirements of' that section. It is simply a
way to incorporate the requirements of the referenced section
without listing them all over again. ' ' Thus, the court read the
language of EPCRA's citizen-suit provision to authorize "suits not
only for failure to complete and submit forms, but [also] for failure
to complete and submit forms in accordance with [each of] the re-
quirements set forth in the referenced sections."'86
One of the sections referred to in the citizen-suit provision
mandates filing the required reports on a particular date."' Ac-
cording to the Seventh Circuit court, for a facility to fully comply
with the "complete and submit" requirement, owners or operators
must also comply with the requirement that the inventory forms
"shall be submitted on or before March 1, 1988, and annually
thereafter on March I""' and that the toxic chemical release forms
"shall be submitted ... on or before July 1, 1988, and annually
thereafter on July ."'"9 The court emphasized that the timing re-
quirements for the inventory and toxic chemical release forms are
neither guidelines nor suggestions but, by virtue of the word
"shall," are binding-"essential elements of the provisions citizens
have authority to enforce."'90 The court concluded that to read the
plain language of the provisions otherwise, as the Sixth Circuit had
done, "'would render gratuitous the compliance dates for initial
submissions which Congress placed in EPCRA's reporting provi-
sions."' 19
The court also considered EPCRA's legislative history to sup-
port its interpretation of the citizen-suit provision. Citing several
erator of a facility for failure to... [c]omplete and submit an inventory form under
section 11022(a)... [or to] [c]omplete and submit a toxic chemical release form un-
der section 11023(a) ...." 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv).
182. Id. § 11046(a)(1)(A)(iii) (regarding the requirements of inventory forms).
183. Id. § 11046(a)(1)(A)(iv) (delineating the requirements of the toxic chemical
release forms).
184. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1243.
185. Id.
186. Id. (emphasis added).
187. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11022(a)(2), 11023(a).
188. Id. § 11022(a)(2).
189. Id. § 11023(a). See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1243.
190. Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1243.
191. Id. (citing Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg.
Corp., 772 F. Supp. 745,750 (W.D.N.Y. 1991)).
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reports,'9 the court found that Congress clearly placed significant
value on the timing component of EPCRA's reporting provi-
sions.' 93 This construction of EPCRA'9 legislative history is con-
trary to that of the Sixth Circuit in Atlantic States.'94
Finally, the Seventh Circuit sought to "interpret the specific
language of the citizen suit [sic] provision in a way that gives
meaning to the provision as a whole.""' To preclude suits for past
EPCRA violations, said the court, would render the citizen-suit
provision "meaningless."' "If citizen suits could be fully pre-
vented by 'completing and submitting' forms, however late, citi-
zens would have no real incentive to incur the costs of learning
about EPCRA, investigating suspected violators, and analyzing in-
formation."1'9 Furthermore, citizen suits would only proceed when
an alleged violator failed to expend the minimal effort to complete
the required forms. 98 As a result, private enforcement "would un-
doubtedly drop off," and Congress's intent in enacting the citizen-
suit provision would be subverted1 9 Thus, in the Seventh Circuit's
opinion, citizen suits for wholly past violations of the reporting re-
quirements of EPCRA are integral to the success of the statute as
a whole.2°°
3. Holding
Considering the language and underlying purpose of
EPCRA's citizen-suit provisions and of the Act in its entirety, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that "a cause of action exists under
EPCRA for violations that are not ongoing at the time a citizen
complaint is filed., 21 The Seventh Circuit breathed life into the
future of EPCRA citizen suits. This interpretation is entirely con-
192. See id. at 1243 n.2. The court referenced several sources, including H.R. REP.
No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 111 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2893 ("Once
the material safety data sheets are developed, it is crucial that they be made available
to the public in the quickest, most efficient way possible." (emphasis added)) and S.
REP. No. 99-11, at 14-15 (1985) (stating that EPCRA's goal is making "essential" in-
formation "available widely and in a timely fashion" (emphasis added)).
193. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1243 n.2.
194. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
195. Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 1245.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 1244.
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sistent with that court's recent concern about the inability of the
executive branch to protect the environment.202 The decision ap-
peared to reaffirm the holdings of the district courts that had first
considered the issue of citizen suits for wholly past infractions.Y2 3
More importantly, the Seventh Circuit's holding also contradicted
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Atlantic States.2° The legacy of the
Citizens decision, therefore, is discord among the courts as to
whether citizens may bring suit for historical violations of EPCRA.
IV. ANALYSIS: EMPLOYING THE GWALTNEYMETHODOLOGY
Despite their contradictory conclusions, the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits employed similar approaches to interpret EPCRA's citi-
zen-suit provision. Each court began with the plain language of
the statute205 and continued its analysis by considering the Act's
legislative history.26 Thus, the circuit court decisions share com-
mon ground: the methodology dictated by Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.2°7 When the Supreme
Court endeavors to resolve the circuit split, it must proceed from
this common ground.
Indeed, resolution of the split depends entirely on an accurate
application of the Gwaltney decision. Such application will enable
the Court to properly analyze EPCRA's citizen-suit provision.
Many commentators see the Gwaltney decision as the final word
on citizen suits for past violations of all environmental legisla-
tion.2 8 Although Gwaltney specifically addressed citizen suits un-
202. See Barry Kellman, The Seventh Circuit on Environmental Regulation of
Business, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 757, 757 (1989). Kellman's article surveys seven de-
cisions by the Seventh Circuit between 1985 and 1989 that "reveal a court deeply
troubled by its perception of the executive branch's unwillingness (or incompetence)
to perform its statutorily delegated functions to protect the environment." Id. at 757.
Arguably, such concern underlies the 1996 Citizens decision as well-giving more
authority to citizen enforcement suits seems to imply a belief that the EPA, an ad-
ministrative agency created by the executive branch, simply cannot, or will not, en-
force EPCRA on its own.
203. See discussion supra Part II.B.
204. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
205. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1242-44 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3581 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997) (No. 96-643); Atlantic
States Legal Found., Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473,
475-77 (6th Cir. 1995).
206. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1243 n.2; Atlantic States, 61 F.3d at 477.
207. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
208. See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control
Laws-The Citizen Suit Provisions, in 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 1033, 1044
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der the Clean Water Act,209 many recognize it as the decisive case
on the issue of environmental citizen suits because many of the
citizen-suit provisions in environmental statutes are similarly
worded.210
This Comment employs the two-step Gwaltney methodology
and goes a step beyond by discussing various policy considerations
that aid in the analysis. The first section views the issue as a tech-
nical dispute over statutory language, looking at the plain meaning
of the citizen-suit provision in its own right and in light of the en-
tirety of EPCRA. Next, the analysis moves to EPCRA's legisla-
tive history and looks for evidence of Congress's intent in enacting
the citizen-suit provision. The third section uses a policy approach
to resolve the EPCRA citizen-suit issue, arguing that EPCRA's
dual purposes make it a unique environmental statute and that the
Court must necessarily interpret the citizen-suit provision in a way
that furthers both of EPCRA's purposes.
A. The Plain Meaning of EPCRA's Language
In construing the citizen-suit provision under the Clean Water
Act, the Gwaltney Court began by addressing the provision's plain
language.211 "It is well settled that 'the starting point for interpret-
ing a statute is the language of the statute itself.' 2 12 A proper
resolution of EPCRA's citizen-suit issue, therefore, must begin by
looking at the provision's plain language.
EPCRA's citizen-suit provision authorizes citizens to com-
mence a civil action against "[a]n owner or operator of a facility
(ALI-ABA Course of Study No. SA85, June 24, 1996) ("Because most of the
[environmental] statutes contain identical or nearly identical language, the
[Gwaltney] opinion narrows considerably the scope of citizen enforcement actions."
(citations omitted)); Charles N. Nauen, Citizen Environmental Lawsuits After
Gwaltney: The Thrill of Victory or the Agony of Defeat?, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
327, 349 (1989) (stating that Gwaltney held that all citizen environmental suits for
purely historical violations are prohibited); Diana L. Lee, Note, Gwaltney of Smith-
field, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation: Its Implications for Citizen Suits Under
the Clean Water Act, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 571, 593 (1989) (noting that "the future of
citizen suits after the Gwaltney decision is not entirely clear").
209. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 52-56.
210. See, e.g., JEFFREY G. MILLER, ENvTL. LAW INST., CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 7 (1987). As Miller states,
"[t]he citizen suit sections of the various environmental statutes are virtually identi-
cal .... There are perhaps no sections of the environmental statutes where prece-
dent under one statute so clearly applies to others." Id.
211. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at56.
212. Id. at 56 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
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for failure to... [c]omplete and submit an inventory form under
section 11022(a) of [EPCRA] . . . [or] [c]omplete and submit a
toxic chemical release form under section 11023(a) of
[EPCRA]. 213 Like the Clean Water Act's provision, EPCRA's
provision "is not [one] in which Congress' [sic] limpid prose puts
an end to all dispute.",214 Accordingly, the Gwaltney Court recom-
mended that the Supreme Court, when interpreting EPCRA, seek
the "most natural reading" of the language.
The ambiguity of EPCRA's provision lies not in the
"complete and submit" language-both circuit courts agreed that
the citizen-suit provision allows suits for failure to complete and
submit the required forms. 6 Instead, the confusion lies in the lan-
guage "under section 11022(a)" and "under section 11023(a).
'2 17
That language has perplexed the courts: does the word "under"
subject the citizen-suit provision to the timing requirements con-
tained in §§ 11022(a) and 11023(a)? 218
A hallmark of statutory construction is that statutes are prop-
erly interpreted by giving significance to each and every word of
the provision.2 '9 Thus, an accurate interpretation of EPCRA's citi-
zen-suit provision must acknowledge the meaning of the word
"under." Two widely accepted definitions of the word offer some
insight into the meaning of the citizen-suit provision. Black's Law
213. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv) (1994).
214. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57.
215. Id.
216. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3581 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997) (No. 96-643); Atlantic
States Legal Found., Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473,
475 (6th Cir. 1995).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a) requires that inventory forms "be submitted on or be-
fore March 1, 1988, and annually thereafter on March 1." Id. § 11022(a)(2). 42
U.S.C. § 11023(a) requires that toxic chemical release forms "be submitted... on or
before July 1, 1988, and annually thereafter on July " Id. § 11023(a). As discussed
supra Part III, the Sixth Circuit found the "under" language to be insignificant
whereas the Seventh Circuit held that facilities would be liable to citizens for violat-
ing either timing requirement. See supra notes 121-26, 181-86, and accompanying
text.
219. See, e.g., Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 660, 664
(1997) ("Statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative
effect."); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("In construing a statute
we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used."); United
States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our duty 'to give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute' rather than to emasculate an entire
section." (citation omitted)).
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Dictionary states that "under" can mean "according to,"' 2' and the
Oxford American Dictionary defines "under" as "subject to an ob-
ligation imposed by."22'
Given these two definitions, the most obvious reading of
EPCRA's citizen-suit provision is evident: citizens may commence
a civil action against an owner or operator of a facility for failure
to complete and submit forms according to the obligations im-
posed by §§ 11022(a) and 11023(a), including the annual filing of
forms. It follows that citizens may sue facilities that have failed to
annually file the requisite forms, regardless of whether the entity
corrected the omission during the sixty-day notice period.
Employing the Gwaltney "natural reading" methodology, the
logical interpretation of EPCRA's language differs from that
reached by the Court in Gwaltney: while Gwaltney concluded that
the Clean Water Act's citizen-suit provision language precludes
suits for wholly past violations,2' EPCRA's provision seems to
authorize suits for past reporting violations. The reason for this
deviation is readily apparent-the Clean Water Act, like many
other environmental statutes,223 uses the language "to be in viola-
tion," which is clearly directed at present and ongoing violations,
while EPCRA omits such language, thereby necessitating a
broader reading of the provision. Thus, a conclusion that EPCRA
allows citizen suits for past reporting violations is certainly con-
trary to the literal holding of Gwaltney but properly reflects the
language differences between the two statutes.
After discussing the plain meaning of the Clean Water Act's
citizen-suit provision, Gwaltney continued its analysis by stating
that the given reading was "bolstered by the language and struc-
ture of the rest of the citizen suit provisions in ... the Act." 4
Similarly, an interpretation of the EPCRA citizen-suit provision
that permits actions for wholly past violations is entirely consistent
with the other requirements of the citizen-suit provision.
Perhaps the most compelling indication that EPCRA allows
citizen suits for past reporting violations appears in the venue re-
220. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1525 (6th ed. 1990).
221. OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1005 (Heald Colleges ed. 1980).
222. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57 ("The most natural reading of 'to be in viola-
tion' is a requirement that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or in-
termittent violation . . ").
223. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619; Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 6972; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
224. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59.
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quirement of the citizen-suit provision.225 The section states that
any civil action, including citizen suits, "shall be brought in the dis-
trict court for the district in which the alleged violation oc-
curred."26 Although the Gwaltney Court relied on the "pervasive
use of the present tense throughout [the Clean Water Act]" 227 to
conclude that suits could only be brought for present and ongoing
violations, the use of the past tense in EPCRA's venue provision
nevertheless evinces an intent for more comprehensive civil ac-
tions, including citizen suits for wholly past violations. Allowing
citizens to bring such suits, then, is consistent not only with the
natural reading of the citizen-suit provision but also with the use of
the past tense in the venue requirement contained therein.
Two additional points in the Gwaltney opinion apply to a
proper resolution of the EPCRA citizen-suit provision issue. First,
the Court in Gwaltney declared that any conclusion other than one
that limited citizen suits to ongoing violations of the Clean Water
Act "would render incomprehensible" the statute's notice provi-
sion, which, like EPCRA, requires citizens to give a sixty-day no-
tice of their intent to sue.22 Allowing EPCRA citizen suits, how-
ever, would not render EPCRA's notice provision
incomprehensible; in fact, the two provisions are not mutually ex-
clusive and can coexist. EPCRA's notice provision 2 performs an
important function: it allows facilities to avoid additional civil
penalties for each day the violation continues.23° Thus, facilities
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b)(1).
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59.
228. Id. The notice provision of the Clean Water Act is located at 33 U.S.C. §
1365(b)(1)(A).
229. See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(d).
230. See id. § 11045(c). "Any person ... who violates any requirements of section
11022 or 11023 of... [EPCRA] shall be liable ... for a civil penalty ... for each such
violation." Id. § 11045(c)(1). Further, "[e]ach day a violation ... continues shall...
constitute a separate violation." Id § 11045(c)(3). Admittedly, the Clean Water Act
contains a similar provision stating that civil penalties incur for each day of a viola-
tion. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). The two provisions may be distinguished easily, how-
ever. Under EPCRA, facilities may avoid additional violations by meeting EPCRA
requirements such as filing reporting forms. See 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)(1), (3). Under
the Clean Water Act, in contrast, parties must comply with requirements such as at-
taining effluent limitations, meeting national standards of performance, or providing
records and reports in order to avoid additional days of violation. See 33 U.S.C. §
1319(d) (referencing § 1311, effluent limitations; § 1316, national standards of per-
formance; § 1318, records and reports). Comparatively, filing requisite forms seems
less costly and time-intensive than striving to meet effluent limitations. Providing
notice to EPCRA violators can motivate facilities to achieve compliance with the
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may avoid incurring additional monetary penalties while remain-
ing liable to citizens for the days during which the violation oc-
curred.
Second, the limitation on citizen suits when governmental en-
forcement action is in progress "suggests that the citizen suit is
meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental ac-
tion."23' Like the Clean Water Act,232 EPCRA has a provision lim-
iting citizen suits. 33 The limitation prohibits a civil action if the
EPA "has commenced and is diligently pursuing an administrative
order or civil action to enforce the requirement concerned."2''
Another section of the Act describes the EPA's enforcement
authority: "[a]ny person.., who violates any requirement of sec-
tion 11022 or 11023 of ... [the Act] shall be liable to the United
States."2'' The government's authority extends to any requirement
of §§ 11022 and 11023, while the citizen-suit authority only extends
to §§ 11022(a) and 11023(a) of the Act.26 The government, there-
fore, has independent authority to enforce other parts of the provi-
sion, such as §§ 11022(e) 237 or 11023(f).238 Thus, allowing citizens to
bring suit for past reporting violations of §§ 11022(a) and 11023(a)
does not supplant but rather supplements the government's en-
forcement power under EPCRA, because the government still re-
tains sole enforcement authority for the remaining provisions of §§
11022 and 11023.
Following the dictates of the Gwaltney methodology, resolu-
tion of EPCRA's citizen-suit issue requires an examination of the
natural meaning of the specific provision and must consider that
meaning in light of the remainder of the citizen-suit provision.
filing requirements quickly, whereas giving notice to Clean Water Act violators may
not affect the ability of violators to comply with effluent standards or limitations.
Thus, the role of EPCRA's notice provision differs from that of the Clean Water
Act's provision.
231. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.
232. The limitation provision of the Clean Water Act is codified at 33 U.S.C. §
1365(b)(1)(B).
233. See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(e).
234. Id.
235. Id. § 11045(c)(1).
236. See id. § 11046(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv).
237. This provision discusses the availability of "Tier II" information, see discus-
sion supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text, and requires the owner or operator of
a facility to provide such information to state planning commissions, local planning
committees, or fire departments upon request. See 42 U.S.C. § 11022(e)(1)-(2).
238. This provision establishes threshold amounts at which facilities must report
toxic chemicals. See id. § 11023(f)(1).
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Clearly, both considerations support a reading of EPCRA's citi-
zen-suit provision to allow citizen suits for purely historical report-
ing violations.
B. EPCRA's Legislative History
After discussing the plain statutory meaning of the Clean Wa-
ter Act's citizen-suit provision, the Gwaltney Court looked to legis-
lative history for further support of its opinion.2 9 Similarly, the
Supreme Court, when confronting the circuit split over the
EPCRA citizen-suit provision, must look to legislative history to
determine whether Congress intended a citizen in an EPCRA en-
forcement proceeding to have broad authority.24°
Several recurring themes permeate EPCRA's legislative his-
tory. First, the overriding concern of Congress was to make re-
porting and inventory forms available in a timely fashion.241 Sec-
ond, Congress intended to empower citizens with information. 242 It
follows that, in order for citizens to receive the intended benefits
of EPCRA, citizens must have broad enforcement authority to
compel facilities to provide citizens the information to which
EPCRA entitles them. During floor debate, for example, one rep-
resentative recognized "the increased public participation called
for by [the Act] .... [By] allowing for citizen suits in specific cases
to ensure proper conformance with the law, our citizens are given
the opportunity to be heard in the operation of [the Act]. '243
239. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 61-63 (1987).
240. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 111 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2893; S. REP. No. 99-11, at 14 (1985); 132 CONG. REc. 29,763 (1986) (statement
of Rep. John S. McCain III (R-Ariz.)); id. at 29,747-48 (statement of Rep. Bob Edgar
(D-Pa.)); 131 CONG. REC. 34,637, 34,759 (1985) (statement of Rep. James J. Florio
(D-N.J.)).
241. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 111 ("Once the material safety data
sheets are developed, it is crucial that they be made available to the public in the
quickest, most efficient way possible." (emphasis added)); S. REP. No. 99-11, at 14
(discussing one of the statute's goals as "making the inventory available widely and
in a timely fashion").
242. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 34,759 (1985) (statement of Rep. James J. Florio
(D-N.J.)) ("The people we represent have a right to know if they are being exposed
to chemicals that could potentially kill them .... Information about these health
dangers is the basis of the right-to-know concept."); id. at 34,637 (statement of Rep.
Florio) (praising the "[e]stablishment of a strong and effective community right to
know program which requires the disclosure of basic information").
243. 132 CONG. REc. 29,763 (1986) (statement of Rep. John S. McCain III (R-
Ariz.)).
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EPCRA's legislative history is replete with statements of the
overlying purpose of the Act:244 "A... major principle of this pro-
gram is to make information... available to the public .... For
too long, the public has been left in the dark about its exposure to
toxic chemicals." 24 Interpreting EPCRA's citizen-suit provision in
a manner consistent with this purpose would also give citizens a
broad power of enforcement-to do otherwise would frustrate
Congress's intent and even render the provision hypocritical. This
sentiment was echoed in EPCRA's legislative history as well:
"Consequently, the reporting requirements should be construed to
allow the public the broadest possible access to ... information.,
246
Thus, an interpretation of EPCRA's citizen-suit provision that
permits suits for historical violations would be most consistent with
Congress's intent.
C. A Policy Argument. The Need for an Interpretation Which Will
Further EPCRA's Purposes
Beyond utilizing the interpretive methodology employed in
Gwaltney, the Supreme Court, when resolving the existing circuit
split, should also consider policy concerns in an effort to construe
EPCRA's citizen-suit provision correctly. The first policy concern
is the powerful role that citizen suits play in the enforcement of
environmental legislation. Citizen-suit provisions have recently
been the subject of a significant amount of academic commen-
tary, 47 largely due to their unique ability to supplement federal,state, and local enforcement efforts.2" In a time of increasingly
244. See, e.g., id. at 29,761 (statement of Rep. Al Swift (D-Wash.)); id. at 29,747
(statement of Rep. Bob Edgar (D-Pa.)).
245. Id at 29,747 (statement of Rep. Bob Edgar (D-Pa.)).
246. Id.
247. See generally MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS (1993)
(discussing the development and operation of citizen suits in environmental stat-
utes); MILLER, supra note 210 (providing an overview of the citizen suit's origins and
general provisions); Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Ob-
stacles and Incentives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1995) (analyzing the role of citizen suits in the scheme of an environmental justice
movement); Ann Powers, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws:
The Citizen Suit Provisions, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 815 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study No. CA37, Feb. 14, 1996) (describing the common attributes of citizen-suit
provisions in environmental legislation); Beverly McQueary Smith, Recent Develop-
ments in Citizens' Suits Under Selected Federal Environmental Statutes, in 2 EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAW 701 (ALI-ABA Course of Study No. C981, Feb. 15, 1995)
(discussing judicial treatment of various citizen-suit provisions).
248. See Smith, supra note 247, at 703.
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limited governmental resources, "citizens' suits remain appealing
gapfillers... [and] provide another vehicle for doing more with
less." 249
Often, citizen-suit provisions are incorporated into environ-
mental statutes to encourage governmental enforcement and pro-
vide a safety valve when the government fails to adequately per-
form its enforcement duties. ° In general, citizen enforcement
suits are often the sole recourse when a devastating impact threat-
ens the environment and the government fails to act.25' Such suits
are especially valuable when the government has neither the time
nor the money to address pressing environmental issues.
EPCRA's citizen-suit provision clearly promotes these policy
concerns. Considering the infrequency of successful governmental
enforcement of EPCRA's provisions,5 2 citizen suits, as provided
for in EPCRA, may best represent the future of enforcement ac-
tions. In every EPCRA citizen suit to date, the EPA has either
failed or declined to act, yet in each case the court found that a le-
gitimate cause of action existed23 Considering that many facilities
subject to EPCRA have failed to comply with it,2 citizen suits
such as those in the Citizens, Williams, and Delaware Valley cases
may be the only way to achieve full compliance. An interpretation
by the Supreme Court that restricts citizen suits will frustrate fu-
ture compliance by environmental polluters with environmental
statutes.
A second point is that EPCRA is a unique environmental
statute because it demands compliance with informational re-
249. Id.
250. See Powers, supra note 247, at 818 (discussing the legislative history of the
citizen enforcement provision of the Clean Air Act).
251. See Shavelson, supra note 11, at 29 ("The intent and effect of [the citizen
suit] provisions is to empower citizens and groups with the legal tools necessary to
protect their health and environment when government enforcers cannot-or will
not-press forward.").
252. See Wolf, supra note 63, at 274 ("Despite the fact that EPCRA's coverage
extends more widely than other environmental laws, its enforcement is minuscule
compared to theirs." (citation omitted)); Abell, supra note 62, at 599 (stating that "a
lack of funding has slowed the EPA's enforcement activities") (citing Kevin J. Finto,
Regulation by Information Through EPCRA, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter
1990, at 13, 47).
253. See cases discussed supra Part II.B. According to EPCRA, no citizen suits
may be brought "if the [EPA] has commenced and is diligently pursuing an adminis-
trative order or civil action to enforce the requirement concerned." 42 U.S.C. §
11046(e) (1994).
254. See Falkenberry, supra note 8, at 2.
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quirements rather than precise emission limitations, which perme-
ate a majority of other environmental statutes. s5 Admittedly,
EPCRA is one of the more obscure environmental statutes.26 Un-
like high-profile statutes such as the Clean Water Act," the Clean
Air Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),2s9 EPCRA has not
materialized into the specter of federal enforcement or heavy ju-
dicial and administrative penalties
260 as had first been feared.
261
EPCRA enforcement has tended overwhelmingly toward settle-
ment. '2 The relative lackluster results stem in part from the
EPA's failure to "cast out" EPCRA's "regulatory net.., often
enough to make any significant catches." Another factor in
EPCRA's inability to achieve a high profile is the fact that states,
which generally enforce the specific requirements of environ-
mental legislation, play a secondary role in EPCRA enforce-
ment."
Despite EPCRA's obscurity and sparse prosecutions, how-
ever, the Act "arguably has done more than any other federal stat-
ute to raise corporate, government and citizen [consciousness]
about toxic pollution. 26  The Act's toxic chemical release form
provision has made EPCRA one of the more significant pieces of
255. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Clean Water Act provision requiring that all
sources which discharge pollutants comply with strict effluent limitations); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(1)(A) (Clean Air Act provision requiring each state to adopt enforceable
emission limitations in order to achieve national ambient air quality standards).
256. See Wolf, supra note 63, at 220.
257. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
258. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642.
259. Id. §§ 9601-9675.
260. See generally Wolf, supra note 63, at 270-76 (describing the infrequent en-
forcement of EPCRA by the EPA in comparison to the numerous penalties from
other environmental statutes).
261. See id. at 244 ("EPCRA created widespread industry dread about expensive
lawsuits and costly damages which might result from the enforcement or use of the
legislation. This anticipated legislation was expected to rise from ... numerous citi-
zen suits, federal enforcement actions and penalties, and toxic torts based upon in-
formation generated by EPCRA." (footnote omitted)). Fear arose that EPCRA
suits would increase the exposure of businesses to significant toxic tort litigation. See
id. at 245.
262. See id. at 271 (citing Criminal Cases, Fine Collections Rise in 1993, EPA Says
in Report on Enforcement, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1516 (Dec. 17, 1993)).
263. Id. at 276.
264. See it at 276-77 (asserting that state enforcement actions are infrequent, are
not highly regarded by the EPA, and have a grim prospect due to widespread
budget-cutting throughout the states).
265. Shavelson, supra note 11, at 37.
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environmental legislation in years.? The requirement that the
EPA "establish and maintain in a computer data base a national
toxic chemical inventory [(the TRI)] based on data submitted...
under this section"2 7 has had a fundamental impact on toxics re-
porting.m EPA officials have described TRI availability 69 as one
of the most significant weapons in the effort to combat pollution.27
In fact, EPCRA reporting may prove to be a valuable asset to the
EPA in its efforts to achieve compliance with other environmental
statutes.271
EPCRA has also had a significant impact on shaping industry
behavior.272 The public availability of toxic release reports causes
industries to scrutinize and revamp their internal processes in or-
der to reduce chemical discharges in an attempt to avoid poten-
tially damaging publicity.27r The readily available reporting infor-
mation also affects market forces, which have motivated
companies to "conduct pollution prevention audits, implement
company-wide policies to protect workers and the environment,
and take other proactive measures aimed at lowering toxic re-
266. See Wolf, supra note 63, at 220.
267. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(j).
268. See Falkenberry, supra note 8, at 25-26. In his article Falkenberry describes
several uses of the TRI data. First, it allows environmental groups to monitor a facil-
ity's compliance with various release restrictions. See id. Second, it assists the EPA
and state environmental agencies in checking for compliance. See id. at 26. Finally,
it allows environmental groups to influence permitting procedures and to negotiate
with individual contributors. See id.
269. TRI data has been widely available to citizens who may access the informa-
tion by ordering computer diskettes from the EPA, by accessing a computer modem
at many public libraries across the country, or by obtaining hard copies of EPCRA
reports from state or federal agencies. See Gary D. Bass & Alair MacLean, Enhanc-
ing the Public's Right-to-Know About Environmental Issues, 4 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 287,
296 & n.59 (1993); Falkenberry, supra note 8, at 25 & n.124; Nicholas C. Yost & John
M. Schultz, The Chemicals Among Us, WASH. LAw., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 24, 54.
270. See Wolf, supra note 63, at 220-21.
271. See Pritchard, supra note 42, at 244. As Pritchard points out:
[The] EPA plans to use information obtained under EPCRA not only to
enforce EPCRA, but in the enforcement of RCRA, CERCLA, the Clean
Air Act, and the Clean Water Act. [The] EPA will be able to look at
EPCRA reports and determine if the reporter has violated its permit issued
under one of the other environmental statutes.
Id.
272. See Shavelson, supra note 11, at 30.
273. See id.; see also Wolf, supra note 63, at 308 ("The most important impact is
that public availability and disclosure of inventory data has motivated industry to
promise to meet sharp pollution reduction goals in well-publicized campaigns. They
have done this to fend off public outcry and the implications which come from it.").
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leases."7 4 Public disclosure of toxic releases causes industries to
fear EPCRA liability and considerably improves industry behavior
as a result.
Because EPCRA is an informational statute, compliance is
less expensive and strenuous compared to other environmental
legislationV 5 "Facilities simply need to account for the amounts of
chemicals used, stored and released from the site-activities which
should come naturally to a good business."276 As compared to
other environmental statutes such as CERCLA and the Clean Air
Act, which require compliance with specific discharge or disposal
limitations,277 EPCRA only asks that a company report the chemi-
cals that it releases or stores.27 ' To properly confront the split
among the circuits over the EPCRA citizen-suit issue, the Su-
preme Court should acknowledge the impact that EPCRA has on
industry and on shaping the future of the public's awareness of
toxic hazards.
A third policy concern that the Supreme Court should con-
front in properly resolving the issue of EPCRA citizen suits is an
extension of the Act's legislative history-the need to interpret the
provision in a way that gives full effect to the intent behind Con-
gress's inclusion of the provision in the statute. Congress knows
how to define the boundaries of citizen enforcement authority-it
clearly did so when it enacted the citizen enforcement provision of
the Clean Water Act.279 By using broad language within the
EPCRA provision, Congress clearly intended to impart broad en-
forcement authority. If Congress intended to preclude citizen suits
for wholly past reporting violations, it knew how to do so. While
courts must be sensitive to the effect of such requirements on in-
274. Shavelson, supra note 11, at 30. But see Wolf, supra note 63, at 239-40
(stating that "large companies can afford the cost of ... compliance with EPCRA
more easily than small companies" and that "small business[es] ... complain about
[such] regulation as both unnecessary and overly burdensome and inflexible").
275. Furthermore, based on the EPA's estimates that "EPCRA would cost the
average business between $400 and $10,000 a year," Wolf, supra note 63, at 239,
compliance is less costly than noncompliance. See 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)(1)-(3)
(EPCRA's enforcement provision stating that each day of a violation of EPCRA's
reporting requirements can cost up to $25,000).
276. Shavelson, supra note 11, at 30.
277. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(2)(A) (Clean Air Act requirement that all state
implementation plans "include enforceable emission limitations"); id. § 9602(a)
(CERCLA provision requiring the EPA to "promulgate regulations establishing that
quantity of any hazardous substance the release of which shall be reported").
278. See idU §§ 11021-11023.
279. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
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dustry and the economy, they must not allow recalcitrant facilities
to frustrate the purposes of EPCRA, which are to inform the pub-
lic of toxic hazards and to motivate emergency planning. Consid-
ering the ease of compliance, a broad enforcement authority can
only facilitate full compliance. Interpreting EPCRA's citizen suit
broadly would accomplish this goal.
Each of these policy concerns properly acknowledges
EPCRA's individuality among environmental statutes. While
Gwaltney seems to apply to citizen suits brought under any envi-
ronmental statute, the Supreme Court should hesitate to apply its
literal holding to the citizen-suit provision of EPCRA as well. By
employing the interpretive technique of Gwaltney and in consid-
eration of several important policy concerns, the Court must find
that EPCRA citizen suits may be brought for purely historical re-
porting violations.
V. CONCLUSION: A PROPER RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
WILL ALLOW CITIZEN SUITS FOR PAST VIOLATIONS
Because the Citizens decision created a split among the cir-
cuits, resolution of the issue is necessary and inevitable. When the
Supreme Court addresses the EPCRA citizen-suit provision, it
must adopt the interpretive methodology employed by the Court
in Gwaltney to determine how much authority EPCRA's provision
gives citizens. The Court must engage in a comprehensive statu-
tory analysis, considering the significance of and interrelationship
among each of the provisions. Because EPCRA is a unique envi-
ronmental statute, the Court should also consider underlying poli-
cies and interpret EPCRA's provision in a way that furthers the
purposes of the Act.
Between the decisions constituting the circuit split, the Sev-
enth Circuit's opinion in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel
Co. best resolved EPCRA's citizen-suit issue in a manner consis-
tent with the above analysis. First, the decision interpreted the
statute fully, accounting for each word in the citizen-suit provi-
sion!"° Second, the decision acknowledged the legislative history,
which emphasizes the importance of the timing element in the re-
porting requirements.2 Finally, the court addressed some of the
280. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1242-44 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3581 (U.S. Feb. 25,1997) (No. 96-643).
281. See id. at 1243 n.2.
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policy concerns underlying the enactment of EPCRA's citizen-suit
provision. 2 Thus, if the Court correctly analyzes the EPCRA citi-
zen-suit provision according to the Gwaltney methodology, it will
conclude that the Sixth Circuit resolved the citizen-suit issue incor-
rectly in the Atlantic States opinion. The Supreme Court would be
prudent to uphold the Seventh Circuit's decision when it resolves
the circuit split.
In order to continue the successes of EPCRA, the Supreme
Court must interpret the citizen-suit provision in a way that allows
EPCRA suits for historical violations. In doing so, the Court
would properly arm the Davids of the environmental arena with
the resources to fell the corporate and industrial Goliaths in the
battle for information. This significant victory would teach the
Goliaths that they cannot escape the obligations imposed by the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.
-Denise Marie Lohmann*
282. See id. at 1244-45.
283. See discussion supra notes 265-74 and accompanying text.
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